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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of assessing the ad-
versarial robustness of deep neural network models under
both Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Bayesian Dark
Knowledge (BDK) inference approximations. We character-
ize the robustness of each method to two types of adversarial
attacks: the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) and projected
gradient descent (PGD). We show that full MCMC-based in-
ference has excellent robustness, significantly outperforming
standard point estimation-based learning. On the other hand,
BDK provides marginal improvements. As an additional con-
tribution, we present a storage-efficient approach to comput-
ing adversarial examples for large Monte Carlo ensembles us-
ing both the FGSM and PGD attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models have shown promising results in ar-
eas including computer vision, natural language processing,
speech recognition, and more (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and
Hinton 2012; Graves, Jaitly, and Mohamed 2013; Graves,
Mohamed, and Hinton 2013; Huang et al. 2016; Devlin et
al. 2018). Despite these advances, deep neural networks are
well-known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. An ad-
versarial example is an example that differs from a natural
example through a low-norm additive perturbation while re-
sulting in an incorrect prediction relative to the unperturbed
example (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). The lack
of robustness to adversarial examples is a crucial barrier to
the safe deployment of deep learning models in many appli-
cations.
One potential source of adversarial examples in tradi-
tional point-estimated deep neural network models derives
from the fact that the decision boundary geometry can be
minimally constrained away from the training data during
learning. This can lead to quite arbitrary decision boundaries
away from the training data, which may be easily attackable
(Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune 2015). By contrast, Bayesian
inference methods result in predictable and well-behaved
decision boundary geometry off of the training data due to
the Bayesian model averaging effect when computing the
posterior predictive distribution. If many decision boundary
* Equal contribution. Presented at SafeAI 2020.
geometries are all equally likely in a given region of fea-
ture space, the posterior predictive distribution will average
over all of them resulting in both posterior class probabili-
ties and decision boundary geometry with improved smooth-
ness, which may be harder to attack with low-norm adver-
sarial perturbations.
Indeed, Gal and Smith (2018) present theoretical evi-
dence that under certain sufficient conditions there exists
no adversarial examples for a Bayesian classification model.
However, Liu et al. (2019) show that Bayesian neural net-
works implemented using variational inference lack robust-
ness against adversarial samples, and subsequently present a
method that attempts to make them more robust.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are one
of the primary alternatives to variational methods for per-
forming approximate inference in Bayesian neural networks.
While we defer the background on Bayesian neural net-
works to the next section, it is important to note that MCMC
methods give an unbiased estimate to the parameter pos-
terior and the posterior predictive distribution, while varia-
tional methods are typically biased. However, MCMC meth-
ods require materializing or storing samples of the parameter
posterior in order to make predictions, which can have high
computational complexity and storage cost.
To help overcome these problems, Balan et al. (2015)
introduced a model distillation method referred to as
Bayesian Dark Knowledge (BDK). In the classification set-
ting, Bayesian Dark Knowledge attempts to compress the
Bayesian posterior predictive distribution induced by the full
parameter posterior of a “teacher” network into a single,
compact “student” network. The major advantage of this ap-
proach is that the computational complexity of prediction at
test time is drastically reduced. This method has been shown
to successfully reproduce the full posterior predictive dis-
tribution on test data drawn from the training distribution
(Balan et al. 2015).
In this paper, we consider the problem of assessing the
adversarial robustness of deep neural network models un-
der both the MCMC and Bayesian Dark Knowledge approx-
imations. We characterize the robustness of each method
to two types of adversarial attacks: the fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014)
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and projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al. 2017).
We consider the case of a basic convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) architecture and the MNIST and CIFAR10 data
sets. Interestingly, we show that full MCMC-based infer-
ence has excellent robustness to these adversarial attacks,
significantly outperforming standard point estimation-based
learning, while BDK only provides marginal improvements.
This indicates that the BDK distillation procedure is failing
to fully capture the structure of the true posterior predictive
distribution off of the training data. As an additional contri-
bution, we present a storage-efficient approach to computing
adversarial examples for large Monte Carlo ensembles using
both the FGSM and PGD attacks.
2 Background
Bayesian Neural Networks: Let p(y|x, θ) represent the
probability distribution induced by a deep neural network
classifier over classes y ∈ Y = {1, .., C} given feature
vectors x ∈ RD. The most common way to fit a model of
this type given a data set D = {(xi, yi)|1 ≤ i ≤ N} is to
use maximum conditional likelihood estimation, or equiva-
lently, cross entropy loss minimization (or their penalized or
regularized variants). However, when the volume of labeled
data is low, there can be multiple advantages to considering
a full Bayesian treatment of the model. Instead of attempting
to find the single (locally) optimal parameter set θ∗ accord-
ing to a given criterion, Bayesian inference uses Bayes rule
to define the posterior distribution p(θ|D, θ0) over the un-
known parameters θ given a prior distribution P (θ|θ0) with
prior parameters θ0 as seen in Equation 1.
p(θ|D, θ0) = p(D|θ)p(θ|θ
0)∫
p(D|θ)p(θ|θ0)dθ (1)
p(y|x,D, θ0) =
∫
p(y|x, θ)p(θ|D, θ0)dθ (2)
For prediction problems in machine learning, the quantity of
interest is typically not the parameter posterior itself, but the
posterior predictive distribution p(y|x,D, θ0) obtained from
it as seen in Equation 2. The primary problem with applying
Bayesian inference to neural network models is that the dis-
tributions p(θ|D, θ0) and p(y|x,D, θ0) are not available in
closed form, so approximations are required.
Most Bayesian inference approximations studied in the
machine learning literature are based on variational infer-
ence (VI) (Jordan et al. 1999) or Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods (Neal 1996; Welling and Teh 2011). In
VI, an auxiliary distribution qφ(θ) is defined to approximate
the true parameter posterior p(θ|D, θ0). The main draw-
back of VI and related methods is that they typically result
in biased posterior estimates for complex posterior distri-
butions. MCMC methods provide an alternative family of
sampling-based posterior approximations that are unbiased.
The samples generated using MCMC methods can then be
used to approximate the posterior predictive distribution us-
ing a Monte Carlo average as shown in Equation 3.
p(y|x,D, θ0) ≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
p(y|x, θt); θt ∼ p(θ|D, θ0) (3)
Neal (1996) first addressed the problem of Bayesian infer-
ence in neural networks using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
(HMC) to provide a set of posterior samples. The stochas-
tic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) sampling method
improves on HMC by enabling sampling based on mini-
batches of data to improve the time computational complex-
ity of sampling (Welling and Teh 2011); however, the prob-
lem of needing to compute over a large set of samples when
making predictions at test or deployment time still remains.
Bayesian Dark Knowledge (Balan et al. 2015) aims at reduc-
ing the test-time computational complexity of Monte Carlo-
based approximations for neural networks by distilling the
posterior predictive distribution (approximated by Equation
3) of a neural network into another neural network. We will
discuss the details of both methods in Section 3.
Adversarial Attacks: Adversarial examples are care-
fully crafted perturbations to a classifier input that are de-
signed to mislead a classifier while being as impercepti-
ble as possible. Based on the information available to the
adversary, these attacks are broadly categorized as white-
box and black-box attacks. Most methods for adversarial
attacks on deep learning models operate in the white-box
setting (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Madry et
al. 2017; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016; Moosavi-
Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016; Sabour et al. 2015;
Carlini and Wagner 2016), where the model being attacked,
and its gradients, are assumed to be fully known. Conversely,
the black-box setting (Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2017;
Cheng et al. 2018; Chen et al. 2017; Tu et al. 2019;
Ilyas et al. 2018) requires an attacker to find an adversarial
perturbation when its only access to the model is via labeling
queries.
The most successful adversarial attacks use gradient-
based optimization methods. For example, the Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014) is a one-step method that uses the sign of the gradient
to create adversarial examples:
xadv = x +  sign(∇xL(θ,x, y)), (4)
where L is the standard cross-entropy loss computed using
the model prediction given input x and the original label
y, and  governs the magnitude of the perturbation intro-
duced and can be thought of as a step size. Kurakin, Good-
fellow, and Bengio (2017) extended this to a multi-step vari-
ant which is more powerful than single step FGSM. Both
the methods are, however, limited to generating `∞-bounded
perturbations. Madry et al. (2017) introduced a more gen-
eral multi-step variant, which is essentially projected gra-
dient descent (PGD) on the negative loss function. FGSM-
based attacks can be seen as specific instances of PGD under
`∞-bounded perturbations. The main emphasis of the PGD
attack is to apply FGSM k times (number of iterations) with
step-size α ≤ /k, where  is the maximum distortion (i.e.,
attack strength) of the adversarial example compared to the
original input. The resulting adversarial example xt+1 cor-
responding to input x is computed as follows:
xt+1 = Πx+S(x
t + α sign(∇xL(θ,x, y))) (5)
where Πx+S is the projection onto the `∞ ball of radius 
centred at x.
3 Methods
3.1 Approximate Bayesian Inference Methods
For implementing approximate Bayesian inference in neu-
ral networks, we adopt the use of the stochastic gradient
Langevin dynamics (SGLD) (Welling and Teh 2011) method
as a computationally efficient MCMC sampler. We compare
the adversarial robustness of the SGLD approximation to the
posterior predictive distribution to that provided by Bayesian
dark knowledge (BDK) (Balan et al. 2015), which is drasti-
cally more efficient to deploy. SGLD is also used at the core
of the BDK posterior distillation algorithm. We begin by re-
viewing SGLD, and then describe BDK.
Let p(θ|λ) be the prior distribution over the network
model parameters θ. The prior distribution is selected to be
a spherical Gaussian distribution centered at 0 with preci-
sion denoted by λ. We define S to be a minibatch of size M
drawn from D. Let the total number of training samples in
D be denoted by N . θt denotes the parameter set sampled
from the model at sampling iteration t, while ηt denotes the
learning rate at iteration t. The Langevin noise is denoted
by zt ∼ N (0, ηtI). The sampling update for SGLD can be
written as seen below where p (yi|xi, θt) is the likelihood:
∆θt+1 =
ηt
2
(
∇θ log p(θ|λ)+ N
M
∑
i∈S
∇θ log p (yi|xi, θt)
)
+ zt.
(6)
By running this update, we produce a sequence of sam-
ples that converges to the posterior distribution of the model
we are sampling from. This set of samples forms a Monte
Carlo ensemble and is used in Equation 3 when making pre-
dictions. In BDK terminology, the model we sample from
is referred to as the “teacher” model and the set of sam-
pled models is referred to as the “teacher ensemble.” BDK
aims to compress the true posterior predictive distribution as
approximated by a teacher ensemble into a compact, feed-
forward neural network model (referred to as the ”student”
model) using distillation methods to avoid the need to store
samples and compute predictions using Equation 3 at de-
ployment time.
To learn the student model, BDK generates a batch of
samples S ′. S ′ is obtained by adding Gaussian noise of
small magnitude to S . The output of the teacher model
on samples {(x′, y′)} ∈ S ′ is approximated using the
current sample from the teacher model: p(y′|x′, θt+1).
Similarly, the output of the student model, parameterized
by ωt, is computed as p(y′|x′, ωt). The objective func-
tion for learning the student is the KL divergence be-
tween the teacher model’s predictive distribution and the
student model’s predictive distribution: L(ωt|S ′, θt+1) =∑
(x′,y′)∈S′ KL(p(y
′|x′, θt+1)||p(y′|x′, ωt)) and we run a
single optimization iteration on it to obtain ωt+1. This pro-
cess of sequentially computing θt+1 and ωt+1 is repeated
until convergence.
3.2 Attacking Approximate Bayesian Inference
To investigate the adversarial robustness of the Monte Carlo
ensembles produced produced by SGLD and the distilled
student models produced by BDK, we apply two common
forms of attacks adopted in the literature: PGD and FGSM.
Both of these attacks rely on computing the gradient of the
cross-entropy loss function between the model output and
labels w.r.t the inputs. This presents a computational chal-
lenge when the model we must attack is a large Monte Carlo
ensemble consisting of hundreds or thousands of models. In-
deed, even explicitly storing all of the models in the ensem-
ble can be a challenge. To address this problem, we leverage
the fact that the gradient of the loss w.r.t input of the ensem-
ble is a sum of the gradients of the loss w.r.t the input for
each model in the ensemble. For an ensemble {θi}Ki=1 con-
sisting ofK models sampled from the posterior, the gradient
of the loss L(·; θ1:K) w.r.t. input x can be expressed as:
∇xL(y,x; θ1:K) = 1
K
K∑
i=1
∇xL(·; θi) (7)
The previous equation follows directly from Equation 3. As
can be seen clearly, we only need access to a single model
from the ensemble at a time and accumulate the gradients to
obtain the gradient of the ensemble. This enables us to per-
form FGSM and PGD attacks with constant memory while
scaling up the number of models in the ensemble. Further, if
we have access to the data, we only actually need to store
a starting model and a random seed. The rest of the ele-
ments of the ensemble can be sequentially materialized by
re-running the SGLD sampling iteration. This allows us to
also generate attacks for large ensembles while using con-
stant storage cost.
We note that this corresponds to an incredibly strong at-
tack against a Bayesian model as we effectively assume that
we have access to every element of the approximating Monte
Carlo ensemble, despite the fact that the samples could be
updated at any time. Finally, we note that attacking the BDK
student model is straightforward since the student is a stan-
dard feed-forward model. This attack requires no additional
modifications to the original algorithms.
4 Experiments
Our experiments focus on the untargeted attack setting
where the goal is to cause the model to misclassify inputs
that are otherwise correctly classified. We consider the `∞
threat model for the experiments. We study the adversarial
robustness of SGLD Monte Carlo ensembles and distilled
BDK student models. We compare their performance to
standard point estimation of the same model (we use Adam
as the optimizer). We consider the white-box FGSM (Good-
fellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) and PGD (Madry et al.
2017) attacks. We evaluate the models on MNIST (Lecun
et al. 1998) and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, Hinton, and others
2009) datasets in terms of attack success rate and accuracy
on unperturbed test data.
We define the attack success rate as the percentage of
the number of inputs successfully perturbed using the attack
method to the total number of input images that we attempt
to perturb. In all experiments, images that are already mis-
classified by any model are excluded from the attack set. All
results are based on the test set, which consists of 10000 ex-
amples for each data set.
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Figure 1: Performance comparison for untargeted `∞ attacks on MNIST (top row) and CIFAR10 (bottom row).
Models: We utilize CNNs for both the teacher en-
semble and the student model. Further, for a given data
set, we use the same architecture for the teacher as
well as the student. For MNIST, we use the following
architecture: Input(1, (28,28))-Conv(num kernels=10,
kernel size=4, stride=1) - MaxPool(kernel size=2)
- Conv(num kernels=20, kernel size=4, stride=1) -
MaxPool(kernel size=2) - FC (80) - FC (output). For
CIFAR10, we utilize the following architecture: In-
put(3, (32,32)) - Conv(num kernels=16, kernel size=5)
- MaxPool(kernel size=2) - Conv(num kernels=32, ker-
nel size=5) - MaxPool(kernel size=2) - FC(200) - FC (50) -
FC (output).
Model and Distillation Hyperparameters: We run the
SGLD and distillation procedure using the following hyper-
parameters: fixed teacher learning rate ηt = 4 × 10−6 for
MNIST and ηt = 3 × 10−6 for CIFAR10, teacher prior
precision λ = 10, initial student learning rate ρt = 10−3,
burn-in iterations B = 1000 for MNIST and B = 10000
for CIFAR10, thinning interval τ = 100, and total training
iterations T = 106. For training the student model, we use
the Adam algorithm and set a learning schedule for the stu-
dent such that it halves its learning rate every 200 epochs for
MNIST, and every 400 epochs for CIFAR10.
Results: Figure 1 compares the performance of standard,
SGLD and BDK models on MNIST and CIFAR10. We vary
the `∞ distortion from 0.05 to 0.3 for MNIST and from
0.005 to 0.05 for CIFAR10 and report the attack success
rates of FGSM and PGD. For PGD attacks, we run 40 it-
erations with step size of 0.05 for MNIST and 0.005 for CI-
FAR10. Note that lower attack success rate implies higher
adversarial robustness. We can see that the SGLD Monte
Carlo ensembles are significantly more robust to the ad-
versarial attack than the standard models. We also observe
that the adversarial robustness as well as accuracy of SGLD
models increase as the number of models in the ensemble in-
creases. We see that the BDK student models only provide a
marginal increase in robustness as the amount of noise used
for distillation increases. However, this comes at the price of
accuracy as shown in Figures 1c and 1f where we observe
that test accuracy on unperturbed test data decreases with
increasing noise for BDK student models.
5 Conclusions and Future Directions
We have considered the problem of assessing the adversar-
ial robustness of deep neural network models under both the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Bayesian Dark
Knowledge (BDK) inference approximations. Interestingly,
our results show that full MCMC-based inference has excel-
lent robustness, significantly outperforming standard point
estimation-based learning, while BDK provides marginal
improvement. A key direction for future work will thus be
to further investigate the failure of BDK to fully capture the
posterior predictive distribution to see if its deployment-time
computational advantages over MCMC-based methods can
be preserved while enhancing its adversarial robustness.
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